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Over the last decade, the ownership of the banking sector in Latin America has
changed hands from local shareholders to large foreign banks from Spain and the United
States. It is also a fact that the foreign exchange market in these countries has been
segmented through various kinds of restrictions, because the central bank is unable to
function as a lender of last resort in a currency other than its own. The standing issue is
whether in practice, a parent bank e®ectively takes the role of such lender of last resort in
supporting its subsidiaries overseas. If that were the case, the question is whether having a
signi¯cant participation of foreign subsidiaries should be thought as a necessary condition
for lifting such restrictions. The data on the compliance of domestic and foreign banks
with the dollar reserve requirements in Mexico is used to try to address this question. The
answer is a quali¯ed yes. When there are weak domestic banks, it seems that subsidiaries
of foreign banks have a better access to funding in foreign exchange, specially in times of
stress. However, when compared with strong domestic banks, the evidence suggests that
these local entities can do as well or even better than the foreign subsidiaries.
Introduction
The ¯nancial markets in most countries of Latin America, perhaps with
the exception of Brazil, Uruguay and Panama, share two distinctive features.
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1On the one hand, over the last decade the ownership of the banking sector has
changed hands from local shareholders to large foreign banks, mostly from
Spain and the United States. On the other hand, their foreign exchange
market remain segmented to the extent that there are still various forms of
exchange controls, ranging from dual markets to restrictions to borrowing or
lending in foreign currencies 1
The alluded restrictions are not necessarily the outcome of the policy
objective of ¯xing an exchange rate at a given level. The truth is, that there
are countries like Chile or Mexico, where in spite of a de facto °exibility of
their currencies, they have kept some restrictions on either capital out°ows
or on the foreign currency composition of the balance sheet of commercial
banks.
In this paper we focus on the case where the segmentation of the foreign
exchange market is a consequence of the fact that that the Central Bank can
not function as a lender of last resort in a currency other than its own. The
standing issue is whether, in times of stress, the parent bank e®ectively takes
the role of such lender of last resort in supporting its subsidiaries overseas.
The scenario that we have in mind would be one where the host economy
su®ers a shock that adversely a®ects its access to foreign ¯nancing. In such
a situation, it may be the case that the local banks would ¯nd it very costly
or even impossible to renew their outstanding short term credit lines, having
to rely on whatever support they may get from the local authorities. It may
also happen that the foreign subsidiaries would recur to their parent bank
for supplementary funding at pre-shock rates.
If this were the case, a country with a signi¯cant participation of foreign
banks in its economy, could a®ord to lift most restrictions on foreign ex-
change transactions without incurring in signi¯cant risks. This also raises the
question of whether having a signi¯cant participation of foreign subsidiaries
should be thought as a necessary condition for lifting such restrictions.
This paper follows two previous ones on the issue of regulation of foreign
exchange transactions that focus on the Mexican banking sector (Reynoso
[5] and [6]). They explain to some detail, why and how banks are required
to hold a certain minimum amount of liquid assets, denominated in foreign
exchange and issued by A1 ¡ P1 rated governments or corporations. This
paper also joins others, like Chinn and Dooley [2] and Gultekin and Penati
1See Abrams and Beato [1] for a rather comprehensive list of examples in Latin America
and elsewhere.
2[3], who look at di®erent sets of data to try to assess the impacto of di®erent
kinds of forex market segmentation.
Here, we suggest that the setting of Mexico's regulation, specially during
a period covering from December of 1997 to November of 1999, o®ers a rather
practical way of looking at the response of domestic banks vis µ a vis that of
subsidiaries of foreign banks in times of stress:
² During the time, the Russian, Southeast Asian and Brazilian crises had
an appreciable e®ect on the overall cost of funding for bearers of Mexico
risk.
² The available information allows to distinguish the performance of the
dollar book of domestic banks and foreign subsidiaries in Mexico. It is
possible to see how institutions comply with the statutory requirement
and to measure the excess reserves on a daily basis.
² At the time, Mexico still had a substantial proportion of the banking
sector assets in the hands of Mexican banks while some large foreign
banks, like Citibank or Santander, were already present. 2
This paper has four sections. In the ¯rst one we present a simple model
of the optimal response of a commercial bank to a reserve requirement, like
the one in place in Mexico. Section two dwells on the observable character-
istics of the model that are relevant for its estimation and testing. Section
three presents the data and the model to be estimated. Section four has the
estimations and test results.
1 A simple testable model
1.1 Optimal excess reserves
Consider an economy where the regulation of the banking system distin-
guishes between domestic currency and foreign currency transactions. For
notational purposes we will refer to the domestic currency as pesos. The
foreign currency will be the dollar. In this setting, the authorities require
banks to carry two books: one for peso denominated transactions; the other
one for dollar operations.
2In contrast, today more than 80% of such assets are managed by foreign subsidiaries.
3Banks may or may not be required to hold liquid reserves for their peso
book. However, they are required to hold a certain proportion of their total
dollar liabilities in the form of liquid assets.
We will assume that all banks can fund their dollar holdings in the in-
terbank market or by issuing tradeable certi¯cates of deposit placed abroad.
This implies that the general public is not allowed to maintain dollar deposits
in the domestic ¯nancial sector.
We will also assume that there is a subset of banks, the foreign banks,
which can also get their funding from their parent abroad.
We will look now at the decision of the domestic banks on what should
be an adequate level of excess reserves in foreign exchange. Lets A be such
excess. We will assume that A behaves like equation (1) with z » N(0,1).
A = ¹ + ¾z (1)
Now, lets de¯ne a variable ¤, which is the cost that banks bear from
carrying the excess reserves. This cost has two components: when a bank
complies with the regulation, it pays µ, which is the di®erence between the
funding rate and the return on very low yield short term instruments. If the
bank does not comply with the regulation, it is ¯ned by the authorities, to
















Let ¹ be the control variable used by banks in trying to minimize ¤ as
described by equation (2). Take ¯gure (1)as a visualization aid that displays
how much the cost, ¤ would be for various choices of ¹ when £ = 0:20,
µ = 0:10 and ¾ = 1.
Figure (2) results from the solution of the minimization problem. The
surface is the optimal average excess reserves, ¹¤, for various combinations
of values of £ and ¾.
1.2 Testable features
Two salient facts are worth noticing from the solution above:
4Figure 1: Cost function. £ = 0:20, µ = 0:10 and ¾ = 1
² As the penalty rate, £, gets closer to the market funding rate µ, ¹¤ gets
closer to zero. Therefore, if foreign banks can get funding from their
headquarters at rates below the penalty rate, then they would show,
in average, lower levels of excess reserves than the local banks, who by
assumption cannot avoid the penalty whenever they get hit by a large
enough shock (z ·
¡¹
¾ )
² The average excess reserves increases with the volatility of the funding
needs. Therefore, in times of stress, one should expect to see an increase
in the average holdings of reserves across banks. Only in the extreme
case where £ = µ, changes in volatility would have no impact on ¹¤
2 Observable characteristics of the model rel-
evant for its estimation and testing.
Following the reasoning above, our objective would be to test whether,
caeteris paribus, the subsidiaries of foreign banks show signi¯cantly lower
levels of excess reserves than the domestic banks.
5Figure 2: Optimal Average Excess Reserves ¹¤ for µ = 0:10
2.1 Censored observations
Notice that, regardless of their ownership status, those banks complying
with the reserve requirement would be expected to record a level of excess
reserves described by equation (4)
At =
½





From this speci¯cation, the sample mean of the excess reserves de¯ned








Figure 3 displays an example of this bias. The ¯rst panel shows the his-
togram for the sample means of 200 samples, each one with 500 independent
observations generated by the process (1), with ¹¤ = 0 and zt » N(0,1) for
all t.
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MLE mean estimate of censored sample
Figure 3: Histograms for various estimates of ¹
The second panel shows the distribution of the same statistic ^ ¹ for the
process (4). The statistic is noticeably biased upwards with a mean around
0:4.
The third panel depicts the distribution of ¹MLE, which expression (6),









2.2 The issue of smooth pasting
In practice, most compliant banks will not show excess reserve values of
exactly zero. It is reasonable to think that even the bank with the best access
to credit will show some positive level for At, instead of hitting the boundary
every time zt is negative enough . This is like a smooth pasting condition.
To see what this implies, lets consider that instead of having equation
(4), banks follow rule (7), with Á very small, but larger than 0. One example








350 Sample from a N(0,1) censored at f=0.25
Figure 4: Smooth pasting. Histogram from a sample of 500 observations









In a case like this, the solution to the maximum likelihood estimation
problem of equation (6) would be (8). This is because the value for which
we would be making the censoring lies behind the actual point where our
hypothetical bank decided to set its minimum excess reserves. From an esti-
mation standpoint, this result will show the same bias as the one illustrated








One possible solution would be to arbitrarily censor the observations at
some level above zero. This in turns, raises the question on where to censor
the data.
Figure (5) reports the histogram of the estimator ¹
0MLE, which maximizes
equation (9), with At generated by a process (4), and for various values of Á.


































Figure 5: Histograms of ¹
0MLE for varios values of Á
Three remarks follow from this exercise.
² Changing the point of arbitrary censoring does not induce any bias in
the estimator.
² As the point of arbitrary censoring Á gets farther away from the actual
mean the distribution of the estimator shows a larger variance.
² This very situation is a consequence of a likelihood function which gets
°atter with larger values of Á, which not only has the consequence
of less precise estimations but, depending on the algorithm used, it
also makes the numerical optimization process slower and, sometimes,
unable to ¯nd a solution.
92.3 Implementation Steps
In sections 3 and 4 we will de¯ne and estimate a model for testing whether
or not banks have di®erential access to foreign funding depending on who
owns them.
In doing so, and for the reasons highlighted above, we will proceed along
the following three steps:
² Building a panel data set that would allow us to compare the trajec-
tories of excess reserves across banks during a period where credit to
Emerging Markets was tight.
² Further censoring the available data on excess reserves to address the
smooth pasting issue.
² Estimating the model along the lines of the TOBIT methodology.
3 Model Speci¯cation
3.1 The Data
As we mentioned before, between December of 1997 and December of
1999, the Emerging markets went through the Asian, Russian and Brazilian
crisis. During these episodes, the access of Emerging Economies to the in-
ternational credit markets may have not stopped altogether, but it de¯nitely
got signi¯cantly tighter. Even in the more fortunate cases, like Chile, where
a decoupling from other economies crisis was claimed, the spreads of their
sovereign and corporate debt increased appreciably.
The commercial banks in Mexico were de¯nitely a®ected by this situation.
Although there is not a comprehensive and publicly available data on the
conditions in which they got their ¯nancing, there is a good deal of anecdotal
evidence which suggests that they had to come up with rather creative ways
of building an acceptable collateral to keep the short-term debt rolling over.3
At the time, there were 19 commercial banks in Mexico which:
² Were neither intervened by the authorities nor were in the process of
liquidation, as a consequence of the 1994-95 crisis.
3One of the best examples is the securitization of credit card receivables for transactions
in dollars. Also, the securitization of receivables from money transfers made by expatriated
Mexican workers in the US
10Variable Description Source
Ai;t Excess reserves/30 moving average Hernandez [4]
of liabilities due on the next day
Periodicity: Daily 12/01/97 12/01/99
Number of banks: 19
MEXICANi Dummy variable Hernandez [4]
Value:1 if bank is Mexican
AMERICANi Dummy Variable Hernandez [4]
Value:1 if holding is US corporation.
DERIV ATIV ESi Dummy variable Hernandez [4]
Value:1 if bank complies with the
risk management standards that the
central bank requires from
intermediaries to operate with derivatives.
SPREADt Bid ask spread in the dollar-peso market Infosel Financiero
Periodicity: Daily 12/01/97 12/01/99
Dollar venta - Dollar compra
Units: (MEP/US$)
CETESt One day repo rate for 28 day Infosel Financiero
Mexican Treasury bills, CETES
Periodicity: Daily 12/01/97 12/01/99
Units: percent
UMSt Spread over US Treasuries of the JP Morgan
UMS 11 1
2 due in 2026
Periodicity: Daily 12/01/97 12/01/99
Units: basis points
Table 1: Characteristics of the Data
² Were active participants in the foreign exchange market.
All those banks were subject to regulation 2019/95 4, which basically re-
quired them to maintain a certain minimum balance in short term US Trea-
suries or equivalent in A1=P1-rated dollar denominated debt instruments.
Banks were asked to meet this requirement on a daily basis. To that end,
they ¯lled out a report known as RL004 5, which shows information on the
term structure of their assets and liabilities in dollars.
In principle, the information from the RL004 is considered as con¯dential
by the central bank. Fortunately, there is a study by Hernandez [4] who
4Described in more detail by Hernandez [4] and by Reynoso [5]
5Later on it was replaced by the ALCME report, currently in use
11focuses on the degree of compliance of the banks during our sample period.
The study contains disaggregated information in such a way that it is possible
to distinguish across banks although, it is not possible to exactly associate
the data to any speci¯c bank. The main reason is that in order to maintain
the con¯dentiality, Hernandez reports the data after it is normalized by a 30
day centered moving average of the total liabilities due on the next business
day.
The data used in this paper is described in table 1. The sample has two
years of daily data for 19 banks. These banks are classi¯ed according to two
criteria:
Nationality of the owner. We will recognize three categories, Mexican,
banks with American or Canadian parents, and the rest: European
and Asian. We will use two dummy variables to capture the e®ects of
this classi¯cation: one for the Mexican and another for the Americans.
The constant term will therefore capture the ¯xed e®ects of the other
nationalities. the regressions
Strength of internal controls. Regulation 2019=95 also stated that only
banks with adequate risk management capabilities could operate with
dollar-derivatives. The central bank also precluded banks with inade-
quate capitalization from participating in the derivatives markets. That
was the case of banks who substantially bene¯ted from the regulatory
forbearance granted by the National Banking Commission. 6 In some
way, this dummy variable can also be thought as a proxy of the under-
lying ¯nancial strength of the institution. 7
Some macro variables will also be used to re°ect the general market
conditions, such as the spread in the peso-dollar market; the one day repo
rate for the 28 day CETE (Treasury Note) and the strip spread of the UMS
111
2% due in 2026 over the comparable US Treasury instrument.
6It must be noticed that in Mexico, banking regulation is shared by the Ministry of
Finance (through the National Banking Commission) and the autonomous Central Bank.
Their policy approach does not necessarily coincides at all times. That is the reason why
one could see some facilities granted by some authority which are not acknowledged by
the other.
7It should be said that the published information on the capital adequacy of banks is
not used here for, in our opinion, such data was excessively contaminated by the accounting
facilities granted by the authorities at the time.
123.2 The model
The basic idea is that all banks look every day at the macro environment
and determines a reasonable amount of excess reserves. In principle, all banks
would process the macro information in the same way. Once this is done,
each bank may or may not include an additional amount of reserves. This
will depend on how skilled they are to handle risk and how certain they are
about having a reliable source of funding in times of stress. Equation(10)
tries to describe this behavior.
Ai;t = constant + ¯1 Ai;t¡1+
¯2 MEXICANi + ¯3 AMERICANi+
¯4 SPREADt + ¯5 UMS + ¯6CETES
¯7 DERIV ATIV ESi+
²i;t
t=f1,..., 507g and i=f1,...,19g
(10)
Our main purpose will be to compare the situation of a group of banks
relative to the others. For that reason we will focus on the relative value of
the estimates of the constant term, ¯2 and ¯3. In principle, these parameters
give us a ranking of banks from the point of view of their access to funding.
Those with smaller ¯ will be thought as the ones with a better access to the
credit market. Table 2 displays the cases that we will be looking at in the
next section.
Case Interpretation
constant = ¯2 = ¯3 No evidence of di®erential access to
funding by reason of the nationality
of the controlling shareholder
¯2 > 0 Evidence of a more
advantageous access of European-Asian
banks versus Mexican banks
¯3 > 0 Evidence of a more
advantageous access of European-Asian
banks versus American banks
¯2 ¡ ¯3 > 0 Evidence of a more
advantageous access of American
banks versus Mexican banks
Table 2: Interpretation of the parameters
134 Estimation
4.1 A point of Reference: FGLS estimation
Without overlooking the discussion of section 2, we present here the re-
sults of the FGLS estimation of the model in equation(10) as a way of having
a point of reference to compare the results of the TOBIT estimation ahead.
Table 3 displays the results of a simple panel data estimation under dif-
ferent assumptions about the structure of the variance-covariance matrix of
²i;t.
The ¯rst column corresponds to a pooled OLS estimation where the vari-
ance of the error term is described by equation (11).
E(²i;t ²i0;t0) =
½
¾2 t = t0 and i = i0
0 otherwise (11)
The second column assumes that each panel is homoscedastic, although






i i = i0;t = t0
¾2
i 6= ¾2
i0, i 6= i0
0 otherwise
(12)
The third column considers the possibility of autocorrelation with the
structure described by expression (13).
E(²i;t ²i0;t0) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
¾2
i i = i0;t = t0
½i¾2
i i = i0;t0 = t ¡ 1
¾2
i 6= ¾2
i0, i 6= i0
½i 6= ½i0, i 6= i0
0 otherwise
(13)
In our opinion, the remarks worth making from these results are:
² The speci¯cation that appears to be more adequate is the one described
in equation (12).
² While the constant term appears to be signi¯cantly di®erent from zero,
the dummies for Mexican and American banks are not signi¯cantly
di®erent from zero. For completeness, table 4 reports the Â2 test for the
null hypothesis of ¯2 = ¯3, not being able to reject it at any reasonable
level of signi¯cance.
14² Following Bonferroni's criterion for 5% signi¯cance level testing, the
critical p-values should be around 0:625% for our 8 coe±cient model.
This leaves only the constant term, the coe±cient on the lagged vari-
able and the DERIVATIVES dummy as signi¯cant. Furthermore, the
DERIVATIVES dummy has similar size and opposite sign as the con-
stant. This would lead to the conclusion that it is not the nationality of
the bank what matters, but its ¯nancial and organizational strength.
Therefore, in the case of a bank with a DERIVATIVES dummy equal
to one, its steady-state excess reserves will be very close to zero in
expected value.
² Although too close to zero for an acceptable level of signi¯cance, the
CETES and UMS coe±cients show the sign we would have expected.
On the one hand, the spread on the UMS increases with a tight dol-
lar credit market. In such conditions, prudent banks would respond
by increasing their holdings. On the other hand, the CETES rate is
highly correlated with the interbank peso market, with which some
banks would fund dollar holdings 8. As the cost of funding in pesos
increases, banks would try to economize as much as possible in their
excess reserves.
A further view at the data raises an issue worth exploring in more detail.
During this time, not all banks complied faultlessly with the regulation.
Table 4.1 shows the proportion of the 507 observations per bank when excess
reserves were negative. The problem that could arise with this situation is
that non-compliant banks may report a lower mean for their excess reserves,
not because they handle their liquidity position better than the rest, but
because they show negative values.To address this issue, we run again the
estimation exercise, but this time excluding banks 5;7;13;16 and 17.
The results that appear in tables 6 and 7 do not alter the story implied
by the estimation including all banks . Perhaps the only aspect that deserves
any mentioning would be that the CETES and UMS coe±cients show smaller
p-values. However, they remain insigni¯cant for a 5% signi¯cance level, if we
stick to Bonferroni's testing criterion.
8According to Hernandez [4], most banks in the sample reported a long net dollar
position during the period of study
154.2 TOBIT estimation
4.2.1 Methodological considerations
In this section we will explicitly consider the fact that for most banks and
for most of the time, their excess reserves are bounded at values around zero,
but not exactly zero. The consequences, already explained in section 2.2,
suggest the application of a TOBIT estimation method as a way to avoid a
possible estimation bias.
Before doing so, there are some standing issues that needed to be resolved
before and during the estimation itself.
Addressing possible Heteroscedasticity . Although we have mentioned
that the results of the previous section are likely to be biased, we should
not overlook that there is some indication of possible heteroscedasticity
across banks. The precise structure of such situation is not known at
this point, however a place to start could be to normalize the data, both
dependent and independent variables, using some unbiased estimator
of the standard deviation of the error for each bank.
² Step 1. We ran a TOBIT estimation for each bank separately.
We decided to set the censoring level for this step at A = 0:1. The
regression model used for each bank was the same as equation (10),
with the restriction of ¯2 = ¯3 = ¯7 = 0.
² Step 2. We used the 19 standard error estimates of the regression
to normalize the data, including the dummies, corresponding to
each block in the panel.
De¯ning the point where to censor the data. If a typical sample for
any bank looks like ¯gure 4, then we know that censoring too soon
would lead to biased estimators, and censoring too late would not only
cost in terms of e±ciency, but the optimization algorithms would have a
hard time ¯nding an optimum, as the likelihood function gets more °at.
For that reason we opted for a criterion that would look at censoring
points that:
² Are beyond the point where the value of likelihood function 9
jumps appreciably from the one it has when evaluated with the
FGLS estimates.
9Evaluated at the optimum
16² Sacri¯ce as little information as possible. Preferably, choosing a
censoring point where more than half of the observations remain
un-censored.
² Step 3. The observations for the independent variable are then
censored at di®erent points, until we ¯nd those satisfying these
two criteria.
Choosing the estimation procedure The ¯nal step consist of estimat-
ing a model homoscedastic across blocks (since the data has been nor-
malized) which, for the sake of increasing e±ciency, would consider a
random-e®ects type of covariance structure.
² Step 4. Model in equation (10) is estimated using the xttobit







2 i = i0;t = t0
¾2
1 i = i0;t 6== t0
0 otherwise
(14)






² It should be pointed out that, to the extent that the standard
errors in Step 1 come from a sample censored at the right place,
b ¾2
2 will in turn take values close to 1.
4.2.2 Results
Table 8 displays the results when we take the sample with all 19 banks
included. As expected, there are some aspects that are worth underscoring .
² The ¯rst column displays results which still look very similar to the
FGLS estimation. We will leave this column only as a reference.
² The next two columns show a positive coe±cient for the dummy for
the Mexican banks. This leads to conclude that Mexican banks appear
to show the kind of response that we would think of institutions with a
less advantageous access to international markets than European and
Asian Banks.
17² In both cases, the constant is also positive. Its size, of about 0:30
means that even European and Asian subsidiaries place an extra re-
serves equivalent to 4:7 days of due loans 10In contrast, Mexican banks
would show an excess coverage between 6:4 and 7:6 days, depending on
which column we look at.
² American banks show, either zero or positive values for the coe±cients
of their respective dummy. However, as suggested by table 9, in these
two cases, ¯3 is signi¯cantly smaller than the coe±cient for Mexican
banks. This o®ers some evidence that American banks behaved in a
way consistent with better access to external funding.
² The estimated value for ¾2 is close enough to one, which should give us
some comfort with respect to the way in which we conducted the Step
1 in the estimation sequence.
² There is a signi¯cant and sizeable random e®ects component in the
total standard error (^ µ is around 0.30), which suggests that beyond the
nationality argument, the funding conditions and decisions are subject
to relatively large company-speci¯c shocks.
² Finally, except for the SPREAD macro variable, the other ones become
signi¯cantly di®erent from zero this time around for a 5% signi¯cance
level. They also display the expected signs.
In synthesis, in this exercise, the European and American banks fare
better than the Mexican ones, whereas the model in equation 10 seems to
bring about a rather good representation of the behavior of the Mexican
banking system with respect to to their management of liquidity in dollars.
Tables 10 y 11 correspond to the case where the non-compliant banks are
excluded. When we do this, some interesting things happen:
² Notice that the DERIVATIVES variable is not included. The reason
is that the non-compliant banks and those who are precluded from
operating with derivatives are almost the same. This bring about a
situation of near-collinearity with the rest of the dummy variables and
10If all remaining independent variables are zero, the steady state level of excess reserves
would be º = :33
(1¡0:93) = 4:7.Now, since the dependent variable is (excess reserves/next-
day-due loans), the interpretation of º would be a coverage expressed in number of days
18the constant term. STATA's r MLE algorithm drops this variable
and ¯nds it hard to get a single solution. To avoid this from happening,
we decided to run the exercise again setting ¯7 = 0 from the outset.
² The Mexican banks show a small, negative but signi¯cant coe±cient
for their dummy. This result, combined with the fact that the Amer-
ican banks report a coe±cient signi¯cantly larger than the one of the
Mexican banks, would come to mean that for the sub-sample of strong
performing banks, the Mexicans are as aggressive or as prudent the
foreign subsidiaries.
² In any case, the size of the constant term is not to be overlooked. For
the strong performers, all banks post relatively large excess reserves.
² In this exercise ¾2 is relatively closer to 1, and the contribution of the
random-e®ects component is far more modest than in the previous case
(µ is around 0:1).
² The macro variables are signi¯cant in all cases with the exception of
the peso-dollar spread. They keep the order of magnitude and the sign
of the case where all banks were included.
Conclusions
² Notice that the DERIVATIVES variable is not included. The reason
is that the non-compliant banks and those who are precluded from
operating with derivatives are almost the same. This bring about a
situation of near-collinearity with the rest of the dummy variables and
the constant term. STATA's r MLE algorithm drops this variable
and ¯nds it hard to get a single solution. To avoid this from happening,
we decided to run the exercise again setting ¯7 = 0 from the outset.
² The Mexican banks show a small, negative but signi¯cant coe±cient
for their dummy. This result, combined with the fact that the Amer-
ican banks report a coe±cient signi¯cantly larger than the one of the
Mexican banks, would come to mean that for the sub-sample of strong
performing banks, the Mexicans are as aggressive or as prudent the
foreign subsidiaries.
19² In any case, the size of the constant term is not to be overlooked. For
the strong performers, all banks post relatively large excess reserves.
² In this exercise ¾2 is relatively closer to 1, and the contribution of the
random-e®ects component is far more modest than in the previous case
(µ is around 0:1).
² The macro variables are signi¯cant in all cases with the exception of
the peso-dollar spread. They also keep the order of magnitude and the
sign of the case where all banks were included.
Conclusions
The title of this paper states the question of whether subsidiaries of for-
eign banks can contribute to the stability of the forex market in Emerging
Economies.
The answer is a quali¯ed yes. When there are weak domestic banks, it
seems that subsidiaries of foreign banks have a better access to funding in
foreign exchange, specially in times of stress.
However, when compared with strong domestic banks, the evidence sug-
gests that these local entities can do as well or even better than the foreign
subsidiaries.
In that sense, the conclusion paper takes us back to a common place:
there is no substitute to sound banking . It also implies that local authorities
can do better by having well capitalized and supervised local banks than by
simply allowing foreign subsidiaries in.
As for the more complex topic on the repercussions of the globalization of
banking in the Emerging Economies, there are still some unanswered ques-
tions. For instance, what should be the shared role of supervision and sup-
port of the di®erent ¯nancial authorities involved when subsidiaries of foreign
banks become a very important player in a local market. Also, what would
be the the macro and regulatory conditions that should prevail in the forex
market if a small country would decide to allow the operation of branches
of foreign banks together with local banks and subsidiaries. A look at some
other countries with experiences that complement the one presented here
may o®er some valuable answers on what I think is a very relevant policy
issue.
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21Coe±cient Homoscedastic Heteroskedastic Heteroskedastic
no autocorrelation no autocorrelation autocorrelation
¯1 0.7807 0.7970 0.6900
s.e. 0.0063 0.0065 0.0079
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
¯2 0.1073 0.0084 0.0159
s.e. 0.0306 0.0073 0.0101
p-value 0.0005 0.2503 0.1162
¯3 0.0687 0.0061 0.0116
s.e. 0.0371 0.0067 0.0093
p-value 0.0644 0.3599 0.2085
¯4 -1.0458 -0.2277 -0.2803
s.e. 2.3953 0.5472 0.6614
p-value 0.6624 0.6774 0.6718
¯5 0.0980 0.0092 0.0128
s.e. 0.0283 0.0064 0.0086
p-value 0.0005 0.1555 0.1374
¯6 -0.0229 -0.0017 -0.0025
s.e. 0.0048 0.0011 0.0015
p-value 0.0000 0.1286 0.0874
¯7 -0.1432 -0.3004 -0.4575
s.e. 0.0307 0.0293 0.0369
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
constant 0.2991 0.3063 0.4726
s.e. 0.0670 0.0326 0.0415
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
N 9632 9632 9632
# coe±cients 8 8 8
# covariances 1 19 19
# autocorr. 0 0 1
Log-likelihood -15643.0 -7702.9 -8198.9
Â2 16592.4 18277.6 9602.6
Table 3: FGLS Estimation results. No banks excluded
Coe±cient Homoscedastic Heteroskedastic Heteroskedastic
no autocorrelation no autocorrelation autocorrelation
c Â2 1.2512 0.0963 0.1586
Pr(Â2) > c Â2 0.2633 0.7564 0.6905
Table 4: FGLS Testing ¯2 = ¯3. No banks excluded
22Bank % of days Bank % of days
at fault at fault
1 3.1 11 0.3
2 0.0 12 1.1
3 0.7 13 3.5
4 0.4 14 0.0
5 2.3 15 0.5
6 0.0 16 11.32
7 2.2 17 2.3
9 0.7 19 0.2
10 0.4
Table 5: Compliance with the 2019/95 rule by bank
23Coe±cient Homoscedastic Heteroskedastic Heteroskedastic
no autocorrelation no autocorrelation autocorrelation
¯1 0.8299 0.8164 0.7337
s.e. 0.0065 0.0072 0.0086
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
¯2 0.0465 -0.0031 -0.0020
s.e. 0.0342 0.0072 0.0099
p-value 0.1744 0.6694 0.8355
¯3 0.0454 0.0074 0.0137
s.e. 0.0382 0.0085 0.0115
p-value 0.2353 0.3817 0.2327
¯4 -1.3446 -0.2304 -0.2858
s.e. 2.3936 0.6002 0.7285
p-value 0.5743 0.7011 0.6948
¯5 0.0860 0.0112 0.0157
s.e. 0.0283 0.0071 0.0094
p-value 0.0024 0.1124 0.0953
¯6 -0.0197 -0.0023 -0.0034
s.e. 0.0048 0.0012 0.0016
p-value 0.0000 0.0559 0.0345
¯7 -0.0851 -0.2839 -0.4147
s.e. 0.0343 0.0330 0.0409
p-value 0.0131 0.0000 0.0000
constant 0.2536 0.3020 0.4461
s.e. 0.0723 0.0368 0.0462
p-value 0.0005 0.0000 0.0000
N 7097 7097 7097
# coe±cients 8 8 8
# covariances 1 14 14
# autocorr. 0 0 1
Log-likelihood -10437.5 -4646.8 -5022.9
Â2 17220.8 15723.7 8975.9
Table 6: FGLS Estimation results. Non-compliant banks excluded
Coe±cient Homoscedastic Heteroskedastic Heteroskedastic
no autocorrelation no autocorrelation autocorrelation
c Â2 0.0010 1.6569 1.8744
Pr(Â2) > c Â2 0.9744 0.1980 0.1710
Table 7: FGLS Testing ¯2 = ¯3. Non-compliant banks excluded
24Coe±cient Censored for Censored for Censored for
Ai;t < 0:30 b ¾i Ai;t < 0:35 b ¾i Ai;t < 0:40 b ¾i
¯1 0.9115 0.9314 0.9300
s.e. 0.0072 0.0071 0.0072
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
¯2 0.0033 0.1252 0.2633
s.e. 0.0086 0.0108 0.0162
p-value 0.6980 0.0000 0.0000
¯3 0.0070 0.0021 0.1440
s.e. 0.0090 0.0089 0.0114
p-value 0.4353 0.8117 0.0000
¯4 0.7260 0.3813 0.5209
s.e. 0.6736 0.6814 0.6933
p-value 0.2811 0.5758 0.4525
¯5 0.0295 0.0338 0.0309
s.e. 0.0071 0.0071 0.0072
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
¯6 -0.0111 -0.0106 -0.0106
s.e. 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
¯7 -0.1261 0.1847 0.0618
s.e. 0.0090 0.0156 0.0118
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
constant 0.4944 0.3300 0.2708
s.e. 0.0332 0.0307 0.0302
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
c ¾1 0.3149 0.7374 0.7244
s.e. 0.0128 0.0326 0.0338
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
c ¾2 1.0018 1.0150 1.0227
s.e. 0.0104 0.0107 0.0109
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
N 9632 9632 9632
un-censored observations 5156 5022 4888
censored observations 4476 4610 4744
Log-likelihood -8862 -8731 -8571
µ 0.1 0.3 0.3
Â2 24357.9 20106.7 21908.8
Table 8: TOBIT Estimation results. No banks excluded
Coe±cient Censored for Censored for Censored for
Ai;t < 0:30 b ¾i Ai;t < 0:35 b ¾i Ai;t < 0:40 b ¾i
c Â2 0.1382 108.3767 99.1436
Pr(Â2) > c Â2 0.7101 0.0000 0.0000
Table 9: FGLS Testing ¯2 = ¯3. No banks excluded
25Coe±cient Censored for Censored for Censored for
Ai;t < 0:33 b ¾i Ai;t < 0:35 b ¾i Ai;t < 0:39 b ¾i
¯1 0.8976 0.9004 0.9014
s.e. 0.0093 0.0089 0.0090
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
¯2 -0.1126 -0.0436 -0.0678
s.e. 0.0142 0.0080 0.0083
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
¯3 0.0296 0.0049 0.0443
s.e. 0.0091 0.0086 0.0091
p-value 0.0011 0.5669 0.0000
¯4 0.3179 0.3522 0.3074
s.e. 0.6707 0.6702 0.6768
p-value 0.6355 0.5992 0.6497
¯5 0.0336 0.0330 0.0330
s.e. 0.0067 0.0067 0.0067
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
¯6 -0.0109 -0.0107 -0.0107
s.e. 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
constant 0.3432 0.3320 0.3518
s.e. 0.0348 0.0340 0.0358
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
c ¾1 0.2681 0.3043 0.3396
s.e. 0.0167 0.0139 0.0159
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
c ¾2 0.9787 0.9830 0.9875
s.e. 0.0119 0.0120 0.0121
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
N 7097 7097 7097
un-censored observations 3961 3918 3841
censored observations 3136 3179 3256
Log-likelihood -6777 -6725 -6638
µ 0.1 0.1 0.1
Â2 11535.7 12495.0 12537.3
Table 10: TOBIT Estimation results. Non-compliant banks excluded
Coe±cient Censored for Censored for Censored for
Ai;t < 0:33 b ¾i Ai;t < 0:35 b ¾i Ai;t < 0:39 b ¾i
c Â2 72.1658 27.6343 116.2111
Pr(Â2) > c Â2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table 11: TOBIT Testing ¯2 = ¯3. Non-compliant banks excluded
26